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 CRYPTOCURRENCY AND FINANCIAL REGULATION:  THE 
SEC’S REJECTION OF BITCOIN-BASED ETPS 
I. THE CREATION OF THE REGULATORY CATCH-22 
Cryptocurrency began as a decentralized currency that could 
cross borders and exist free from the oversight of a central government.1  
In the ten years that have passed since bitcoin first launched, cryptocur-
rency has entered the sphere of popular news and general awareness.2  
With this has come increased interaction between cryptocurrency mar-
kets, companies, investors, and financial regulators in the United States.3   
The U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission’s (“SEC”) rejec-
tion of nine proposed bitcoin-based exchange-traded funds (“ETFs”)4 and 
their second rejection of the Winklevoss bitcoin-based exchange-traded 
products (“ETPs”)5 showcased the tension between financial market reg-
ulators and cryptocurrency market innovators.6  When the SEC rejected 
the Winklevoss ETP for the second time in July of 2018, the price of 
 
 1. See Bernard Marr, A Short History of Bitcoin and Crypto Currency Everyone Should 
Read, FORBES (Dec. 6, 2017), https://www.forbes.com/sites/bernardmarr/2017/12/06/a-short-
history-of-bitcoin-and-crypto-currency-everyone-should-read/#1361c7c53f27 (explaining 
the origins of bitcoin).  
 2. See Peter Rudegeair & Akane Otani, Bitcoin Mania: Even Grandma Wants in on the 
Action, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 29, 2017), https://www.wsj.com/articles/bitcoin-mania-even-
grandma-wants-in-on-the-action-1511996653 (expressing the rise of popular awareness of 
bitcoin through the story of an older woman who invested profitably in bitcoin and earned a 
45% profit on her investment, selling as the price of bitcoin neared $10,000). 
 3. See U.S. CFTC OFFICE OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS, CFTC BACKGROUNDER ON OVERSIGHT 
OF AND APPROACH TO VIRTUAL CURRENCY FUTURES MARKETS 1 (2018), 
https://www.cftc.gov/sites/default/files/idc/groups/public/%40customerprotection/docu-
ments/file/backgrounder_virtualcurrency01.pdf [hereinafter CFTC BACKGROUNDER] (detail-
ing the role of regulatory agencies in overseeing aspects of cryptocurrency markets). 
 4. See infra Part II.A.  
 5. See infra Part II.A. 
 6. Nikhil Subba, SEC Rejects Nine Proposals for Bitcoin ETFs, REUTERS (Aug. 22, 
2018), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-bitcoin-funds-etfs/sec-rejects-nine-proposals-for-
bitcoin-etfs-idUSKCN1L802V (pointing out that in August, 2018, the SEC rejected nine ap-
plications for bitcoin-based ETFs—five from Direxion, two from GraniteShares, and two 
from ProShares); see also U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, No. 34-83912, ORDER DISAPPROVING 
A PROPOSED RULE CHANGE RELATING TO LISTING AND TRADING OF THE DIREXION DAILY 
BITCOIN BEAR 1X SHARES, DIREXION DAILY BITCOIN 1.25X BULL SHARES, DIREXION DAILY 
BITCOIN 1.5X BULL SHARES, DIREXION DAILY BITCOIN 2X BULL SHARES, AND DIREXION 
DAILY BITCOIN 2X BEAR SHARES UNDER NYSE ARCA RULE 8.200-E (2018) [hereinafter 
“DIREXION DISAPPROVAL ORDER”] (rejecting Direxion’s ETF proposal).  
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bitcoin fell by 3%.7  It is likely that the pre-rejection price was inflated 
by speculation that the SEC would approve a bitcoin-based ETP.8  This 
fluctuation illustrates both the volatility in the bitcoin market and the im-
pact of regulatory action on bitcoin investment regardless of bitcoin’s in-
dependent origins.9  The orders and releases that the SEC has generated 
in response to bitcoin ETP proposals reveal a number of challenges facing 
those who wish to shape and invest in the cryptocurrency market going 
forward.   
The SEC’s application of legal standards derived from the Ex-
change Act of 1934 in their disapprovals has created a catch-22 for pro-
ponents of cryptocurrency-based ETPs.  ETPs need the SEC’s regulatory 
approval of their investment vehicle, but the SEC’s responses suggest that 
bitcoin-based ETPs may not be able to acquire approval without proof of 
better regulation of the underlying market.10  The creation of a cryptocur-
rency self-regulatory organization (“CSRO”) with which an ETP pro-
poser could enter a surveillance-sharing agreement11 could address the 
SEC’s concerns, although it is likely that the passage of time is the only 
thing that will move the SEC towards approval.12  
This Note proceeds in five parts.  Part II explains the history and 
background of cryptocurrency regulation and ETPs in the United States.13  
Part III analyzes the SEC’s response to bitcoin-based ETP proposals.14  
Part IV examines solutions for future proposals and the likelihood that a 
 
 7. See Katie Rooney & Bob Pisani, Winklevoss Twins Bitcoin ETF Rejected by SEC, 
CNBC (July 27, 2018), https://www.cnbc.com/2018/07/26/winklevoss-twins-bitcoin-etf-re-
jected-by-sec.html (reporting the second rejection of the Winklevoss proposal for a bitcoin 
ETP and the announcement’s impact on the market); see also U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, 
No. 34-83723, SELF-REGULATORY ORGANIZATIONS; BATS BZX EXCHANGE, INC.; ORDER 
SETTING ASIDE ACTION BY DELEGATED AUTHORITY AND DISAPPROVING A PROPOSED RULE 
CHANGE, AS MODIFIED BY AMENDMENTS NO. 1 AND 2, TO LIST AND TRADE SHARES OF THE 
WINKLEVOSS BITCOIN TRUST 76 (2018), https://www.sec.gov/rules/other/2018/34-83723.pdf 
[hereinafter “WINKLEVOSS DISAPPROVAL ORDER”] (setting forth the SEC’s reasons for disap-
proving the Winklevoss proposal). 
 8. Rooney & Pisani, supra note 7. 
 9. See Rooney & Pisani, supra note 7 (“Bitcoin soared to a two-month high above 
$8,300 this week, partially because of rumors that the SEC could approve a similar trading 
vehicle as early as August.”). 
 10. See WINKLEVOSS DISAPPROVAL ORDER, supra note 7, at 76 (establishing the standard 
for ETPs that requires surveillance-sharing agreements with a regulated market of significant 
size). 
 11. See infra Part III. 
 12. See infra Part IV (establishing why more time needs to pass before the SEC will 
approve a bitcoin-based ETP).  
 13. See infra Part II.  
 14. See infra Part III.  
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CSRO can address the SEC’s concerns about bitcoin-based ETPs.15  Part 
V summarizes this Note’s conclusions about the SEC’s treatment of 
bitcoin-based ETPs.16   
II.  THE STATUS OF CRYPTOCURRENCY REGULATION AND ETPS IN THE 
UNITED STATES 
Virtual or crypto-currencies are regulated at both the state and 
federal level.17  U.S. and foreign virtual currency spot exchanges fall un-
der the purview of state banking regulators due to state money transfer 
laws.18  On the federal level, the IRS applies the capital gains tax to virtual 
currencies as it does to other property.19  The Treasury’s Financial Crimes 
Enforcement Network (“FinCEN”) oversees virtual currency transfers in 
its duties to combat money laundering.20  The Commodity Futures Trad-
ing Commission (“CFTC”) has labeled virtual currencies “commodities” 
that fall under the Commodity Exchange Act.21  Finally, the SEC regu-
lates cryptocurrency by applying existing securities laws22 to initial coin 
 
 15. See infra Part IV.  
 16. See infra Part V.  
 17. CFTC BACKGROUNDER, supra note 3, at 1. 
 18. CFTC BACKGROUNDER, supra note 3, at 1. 
 19. INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., NOTICE 2014-21 2 (2018), https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-
drop/n-14-21.pdf.   
 20. Kenneth A. Blanco, Fin. Crimes Enf’t Network, Prepared Remarks of FinCEN Di-
rector Kenneth A. Blanco Delivered At the 2018 Chicago-Kent Block (Legal) Tech Confer-
ence 2–3 (August 9, 2018), https://www.fincen.gov/news/speeches/prepared-remarks-fincen-
director-kenneth-blanco-delivered-2018-chicago-kent-block; CFTC BACKGROUNDER, supra 
note 3, at 1. 
 21. CFTC BACKGROUNDER, supra note 3, at 1. 
 22. JIM CLAYTON, SEC. EXCH. COMM’N, STATEMENT ON CRYPTOCURRENCIES AND INITIAL 
COIN OFFERINGS (2017), https://www.sec.gov/news/public-statement/statement-clayton-
2017-12-11 (stating that ICOs are probably securities because “[p]rospective purchasers are 
being sold on the potential for tokens to increase in value – with the ability to lock in those 
increases by reselling the tokens on a secondary market – or to otherwise profit from the 
tokens based on the efforts of others,” and that the SEC would carry out enforcement actions 
against fraudulent actors). 
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offerings (“ICOs”)23 and other cryptocurrency-based products that qual-
ify as securities or investment companies.24  
A.  Recent Developments in the Cryptocurrency Markets:  The Push 
to Offer Bitcoin-Based ETPs 
Recently, there has been a push to make bitcoin-based exchange-
traded products available to U.S. investors.25  ETPs are derivatively-
priced securities that trade on a national securities exchange.26  Their 
value is derived from an investment instrument such as a commodity, a 
currency, a share price, or an interest rate and they are generally bench-
marked to stocks, commodities, or indices.27  
The various types of ETPs include: Exchange-traded funds 
(“ETFs”), exchange-traded vehicles (“ETVs”), and exchange-traded 
notes (“ETNs”)28 and certificates.29  ETFs are a type of mutual fund 
which “allow investors to buy into a large basket of stocks.”30  An ETF 
 
 23. See id. (“Coinciding with the substantial growth in cryptocurrencies, companies and 
individuals increasingly have been using initial coin offerings to raise capital for their busi-
nesses and projects.  Typically these offerings involve the opportunity for individual investors 
to exchange currency such as U.S. dollars or cryptocurrencies in return for a digital asset 
labeled as a coin or token.”); see also Joseph D. Moran, The Impact of Regulatory Measures 
Imposed on Initial Coin Offerings in the United States Market Economy, 26 Cath. J. of Law 
and Tech. 3 (2018) (providing background on ICOs).   
 24. DIV. ENF’T AND TRADING AND MKTS., SEC. EXCH. COMM’N, STATEMENT ON 
POTENTIALLY UNLAWFUL ONLINE PLATFORMS FOR TRADING DIGITAL ASSETS (2018), 
https://www.sec.gov/news/public-statement/enforcement-tm-statement-potentially-unlaw-
ful-online-platforms-trading (“The SEC’s Divisions of Enforcement and Trading and Markets 
stated that an online trading platform that offers trading of digital assets that meet the defini-
tion of a “security” under federal securities laws and operates as an “exchange” must register 
with the SEC as a national securities exchange or be exempt from registration.”). 
 25. See Number of Proposed Bitcoin ETFs Grows, ETF.COM, https://www.etf.com/sec-
tions/features-and-news/number-proposed-bitcoin-etfs-grows (last visited Feb. 8, 2019) 
(“[Twenty-three] filings for bitcoin ETFs have reached regulators in the past few years.”).  
 26. Exchange Traded Products—ETP, INVESTOPEDIA, https://www.in-
vestopedia.com/terms/e/exchange-traded-products-etp.asp (last visited Sept. 4, 2018).  
 27. Id.  
 28. On September 9, 2018, the SEC suspended U.S. trading of shares of two Swedish 
ETPs which had become available in the U.S. in August, 2018.  The SEC cited confusion over 
the classification of these ETPs, with some trading platforms calling them ETFs and some 
calling them ETNs, in their order suspending trading.  Brent J. Fields, Certain Bitcoin/Ether 
Tracking Certificates (Sec. Exch. Comm’n Sept. 9, 2018) (order of suspension of trading), 
https://www.sec.gov/litigation/suspensions/2018/34-84063-o.pdf.  
 29. Exchange Traded Products—ETP, supra note 26.  
 30. THOMAS LEE HAZEN, THE LAW OF SECURITIES REGULATION 728 (7th ed. 2016); see 
generally DAVID J. ABNER, THE ETF HANDBOOK: HOW TO VALUE AND TRADE EXCHANGE-
TRADED FUNDS (2nd ed. 2016) (describing ETFs in greater technical detail in a manner that is 
geared towards practicing lawyers).  
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“basket” can hold securities, derivatives such as swaps, or commodity 
futures contracts in line with the fund’s investment strategy.31  The shares 
of an ETF “can be bought or sold throughout the day on an exchange at 
a market-determined price.”32  Investors in ETFs receive interest in the 
fund from its investments in stocks, bonds, or other assets.33  
ETFs have six features which make them attractive to retail and 
institutional investors.34  These features include: (1) liquidity and quick 
access to different asset classes because ETF shares can be traded 
throughout the day; (2) price transparency because the trading price of an 
ETF tends to approximate the market value of its underlying securities; 
(3) tax efficiency because few distribute capital gains and many use in-
kind transactions to acquire and dispose of their underlying investments; 
(4) exposure to specific markets that otherwise could be difficult or im-
possible to attain; (5) strong demand from investors for index-linked in-
vestments; and (6) use by financial advisors in third-party asset allocation 
models to manage their clients’ assets.35  One of the major benefits of the 
investment vehicle is that it would allow indirect investment in crypto-
currencies like bitcoin on a regulated securities market.36  
Bitcoin ETPs could be in two basic forms: (1) ETFs that hold 
bitcoin derivatives; and (2) ETPs that physically hold bitcoin.37  Both 
forms of ETPs have applied for approval38 from the SEC and to date have 
not been approved.39  Bitcoin ETFs are structured as “series” of a 
 
 31. THOMAS LEE HAZEN, THE LAW OF SECURITIES REGULATION 728 (7th ed. 2016). 
 32. Kenneth C. Fang & Jane Heinrichs, Understanding the Regulation of Exchange-
Traded Funds Under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, INVESTMENT CO. INST. 2 (Aug. 
2017), https://www.ici.org/pdf/ppr_17_etf_listing_standards.pdf. 
 33. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N., EXCHANGE-TRADED FUNDS (ETFS) (2017), 
https://www.sec.gov/fast-answers/answersetfhtm.html.  
 34. Fang & Heinrichs, supra note 32, at 2. 
 35. Fang & Heinrichs, supra note 32, at 2. 
 36. Hester M. Pierce, Dissent of Commissioner Hester M. Pierce to Release No. 34-
83723, U.S. SEC. EXCH. COMM’N (July 26, 2018), https://www.sec.gov/news/public-state-
ment/peirce-dissent-34-83723 (“An ETP based on bitcoin would offer investors indirect ex-
posure to bitcoin through a product that trades on a regulated securities market and in a man-
ner that eliminates some of the frictions and worries of buying and holding bitcoin directly.”). 
 37. Mina Down, What are Bitcoin ETFs and Why are They Controversial?, 
HACKERNOON (Aug. 22, 2018), https://hackernoon.com/what-are-bitcoin-etfs-and-why-are-
they-controversial-c9509a925594. 
 38. Id.  
 39. See infra Part III.  
144 NORTH CAROLINA BANKING INSTITUTE [Vol. 23 
“Trust.”40  The Trust and Funds are managed by a “Sponsor.”41  Under 
this proposed structure, the Fund would invest in bitcoin derivatives, 
namely futures contracts, which would serve as the benchmark for the 
Fund.42  Shares in the Fund would be created and redeemed in “creation 
units” consisting of, for example, 50,000 shares.43  
The ETP in the Winklevoss Proposal was structured as a com-
modity-based trust.44  The Winklevoss Bitcoin Trust would hold bitcoins 
as an asset and issue and redeem shares in “Baskets” of 100,000 shares 
to authorized participants.45  Transactions for shares or “Baskets” would 
be made “in kind” for bitcoin only.46  Shares of the Winklevoss Bitcoin 
Trust would track the price of bitcoin on the Gemini Exchange which is 
operated by the Winklevoss Bitcoin Trust.47  The Net Asset Value 
(“NAV”) of the Winklevoss Bitcoin Trust would be calculated based on 
the clearing price of the Gemini Exchange’s daily auction of bitcoin 
which occurs at 4 p.m. every day.48   
III. THE SEC’S RESPONSE TO BITCOIN-BASED ETP PROPOSALS 
A.  Regulatory Framework 
The SEC has yet to approve a rule change that would establish a 
bitcoin or cryptocurrency-based ETP.49  In its disapproval orders, the 
SEC has applied a regulatory framework derived from the Investment 
Company Act of 1940 (“the Investment Company Act”) and the Securi-
ties Exchange Act of 1934 (“the 1934 Act”).  Under the Investment Com-
pany Act,  ETFs that qualify as “investment companies” must be 
 
 40. U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, No. 34-83913, Self-REGULATORY ORGANIZATIONS; 
CBOE BZX EXCHANGE, INC.; ORDER DISAPPROVING A PROPOSED RULE CHANGE TO LIST AND 
TRADE THE SHARES OF THE GRANITESHARES BITCOIN ETF AND THE GRANITESHARES SHORT 
BITCOIN ETF 3 (August 22, 2018), https://www.sec.gov/rules/sro/cboebzx/2018/34-
83913.pdf [hereinafter “GRANITESHARES DISAPPROVAL ORDER”].   
 41. Id. at 3. 
 42. Id. at 4.  
 43. DIREXION DISAPPROVAL ORDER, supra note 6, at 3.  
 44. See WINKLEVOSS DISAPPROVAL ORDER, supra note 7, at 7 (stating that the fund would 
physically hold bitcoin).  
 45. WINKLEVOSS DISAPPROVAL ORDER, supra note 7, at 7.   
 46. WINKLEVOSS DISAPPROVAL ORDER, supra note 7, at 7.   
 47. WINKLEVOSS DISAPPROVAL ORDER, supra note 7, at 7.   
 48. WINKLEVOSS DISAPPROVAL ORDER, supra note 7, at 7.   
 49. Subba, supra note 6. 
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registered with the SEC.50  An ETF is required to obtain relief from the 
1934 Act if it is to be listed and traded in the U.S. secondary market.51  
The first ETF began trading in 1993.52  This ETF was “a broad-based 
domestic equity fund tracking the S&P 500 index.”53  Since 1992, the 
SEC has issued over 300 exemptive orders allowing ETFs to operate un-
der the Investment Company Act.54   In the U.S., there are over 1,900 
ETFs that account for almost 15% of total investment company assets.55 
The process for SEC approval and review of listing rules has been 
streamlined for ETFs that meet “generic listing standards.”56  Exchanges 
proposing ETFs that do not meet “generic listing standards” must propose 
specific listing rules for their ETF before the SEC.57  This regulatory ap-
proval format is why the proposals to establish bitcoin-based ETFs are 
described as a “proposed rule change.”58  The SEC’s letters and orders in 
response to these proposed rule changes provide insight into the legal 
standards and policy considerations that hopefuls must meet in their quest 
to offer bitcoin-based ETFs.  
B.  The SEC’s First Disapproval of a Bitcoin ETP:  The Winklevoss 
Order 
The SEC’s first disapproval of a bitcoin-based ETP was for a 
commodity-trust ETP based on bitcoin.59  This disapproval order will be 
referred to as the “Winklevoss Order” because the proposal was 
 
 50. Staff Letter on Engaging on Fund Innovation and Cryptocurrency-related Holdings, 
SEC. EXCH. COMM’N (Jan. 18, 2018), https://www.sec.gov/divisions/investment/noac-
tion/2018/cryptocurrency-011818.htm (applying the Investment Company Act to potential 
cryptocurrency-based ETPs and presenting five categories of questions for funds that are in-
tending to hold cryptocurrency or related products: (1) Valuation; (2) Liquidity; (3) Custody; 
(4) Arbitrage for ETFs; (5) Potential Manipulation and Other Risks.); see also, Fang & Hein-
richs, supra note 32, at 2 (explaining how ETFs are regulated under the 1934 Act).  
 51. So You Want To Launch An ETF, ETF.COM (July 1, 2006), https://www.etf.com/pub-
lications/journalofindexes/joi-articles/2305.html?nopaging=1 (explaining how ETFs function 
and are formed).   
 52. Fang & Heinrichs, supra note 32, at 5.  
 53. Fang & Heinrichs, supra note 32, at 5. 
 54. Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n., SEC Proposes New Approval Process 
for Certain Exchange-Traded Funds (June 28, 2018) (on file with author), 
https://www.sec.gov/news/press-release/2018-118.  
 55. Id.   
 56. So You Want to Launch an ETF, supra note 51.  
 57. So You Want to Launch an ETF, supra note 51. 
 58. So You Want to Launch an ETF, supra note 51. 
 59. WINKLEVOSS DISAPPROVAL ORDER, supra note 7, at 7.  
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spearheaded by the Winklevoss twins who were early investors in 
bitcoin.60  According to the proposal, shares of the Winklevoss Bitcoin 
Trust were to track the price of bitcoin being traded on the Gemini Ex-
change and would be listed on the Bats BZX Exchange.61  The SEC dis-
approved of this proposal in March of 2018 and reaffirmed its decision in 
July of 2018 following BZX’s petition for review of the decision.62  In its 
petition for review of the SEC’s March disapproval, BZX presented the 
SEC with a surveillance-sharing agreement63 with the Gemini Exchange 
and also argued that bitcoin markets are inherently resistant to market 
manipulation.64  Because it was the first bitcoin-based ETP proposal that 
the SEC ruled on, the Winklevoss Order set out the SEC’s reasoning and 
statutory analysis regarding bitcoin-ETPs in the greatest amount of de-
tail.65  
Since the Winklevoss Order, the SEC has pointed to Section 
6(b)(5) of the 1934 Act as the legal standard that ETP proposals must 
meet regardless of whether they are for commodity-trust ETPs or ETFs 
based on bitcoin futures.66  Section 6(b)(5) requires that:  
 
The rules of the exchange are designed to prevent fraud-
ulent and manipulative acts and practices, to promote just 
and equitable principles of trade, to foster cooperation 
and coordination with persons engaged in regulating, 
clearing, settling, processing information with respect to, 
and facilitating transactions in securities, to remove im-
pediments to and perfect the mechanism of a free and 
open market and a national market system, and, in gen-
eral, to protect investors and the public interest; and are 
not designed to permit unfair discrimination between cus-
tomers, issuers, broker, or dealers, or to regulate by virtue 
of any authority conferred by this chapter matters not 
 
 60. Readers may also recognize the Winklevoss twins as the brothers who sued Mark 
Zuckerberg for stealing their idea when he created Facebook.  
 61. WINKLEVOSS DISAPPROVAL ORDER, supra note 7, at 7. 
 62. WINKLEVOSS DISAPPROVAL ORDER, supra note 7, at 1–2.  
 63. See infra Part III. 
 64. WINKLEVOSS DISAPPROVAL ORDER, supra note 7, at 4. 
 65. Compare WINKLEVOSS DISAPPROVAL ORDER, supra note 7, with GRANITESHARES 
DISAPPROVAL ORDER, supra note 40. 
 66. GRANITESHARES DISAPPROVAL ORDER, supra note 40, at 8.  
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related to the purposes of this chapter or the administra-
tion of the exchange.67  
 
According to the SEC, ETP proposals fail to meet this standard when they 
do not design rules to “prevent fraudulent and manipulative acts and prac-
tices” that include surveillance-sharing agreements with markets of sig-
nificant size.68  
C.  The SEC’s Interpretation of Section 6(b)(5) to Require a 
Surveillance-Sharing Agreement with a Regulated Market of 
Significant Size  
In the Winklevoss Order, the SEC designated a section in their 
discussion to explaining “[t]he history and importance of surveillance-
sharing agreements relating to derivative securities products.”69  The pri-
mary goal of surveillance-sharing agreements is to “detect and deter mar-
ket manipulation and other trading abuses” through the sharing of infor-
mation between the listing exchange and the exchange trading the 
underlying stock.70  The SEC set out five provisions and qualities that 
surveillance-sharing agreements should provide to accomplish this 
goal.71  Agreements should provide for sharing information about: (1) 
market trading activity; (2) clearing activity; and (3) customer identity.72  
The parties to the agreement should also have (4) the reasonable ability 
to obtain and produce requested information, and (5) a lack of “existing 
rules, laws or practices [that] would impede one party to the agreement 
from obtaining this information from, or producing it to, the other 
party.”73  
In her dissent from the SEC majority’s disapproval of BZX’s pro-
posed rule change, Commissioner Hester Pierce argued that whether a 
proposer has established a surveillance sharing agreement with a “regu-
lated market of significant size” is not “the appropriate test” for ap-
proval.74  She noted that prior to 2017, approval orders for ETPs “seem 
 
 67. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 6(b)(5), 15 U.S.C. § 78f(b)(5) (2012).   
 68. WINKLEVOSS DISAPPROVAL ORDER, supra note 7, at 76.  
 69. WINKLEVOSS DISAPPROVAL ORDER, supra note 7, at 49–54.  
 70. WINKLEVOSS DISAPPROVAL ORDER, supra note 7, at 51. 
 71. WINKLEVOSS DISAPPROVAL ORDER, supra note 7, at 49–51.  
 72. WINKLEVOSS DISAPPROVAL ORDER, supra note 7, at 49–51. 
 73. WINKLEVOSS DISAPPROVAL ORDER, supra note 7, at 49–51. 
 74. Pierce, supra note 36.  
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to place less explicit emphasis on the presence of an agreement with a 
‘significant, regulated market.’”75  The SEC justified its use of this test 
by differentiating its approvals of ETPs without surveillance-sharing 
agreements with a regulated market of a significant size from the bitcoin-
ETP before it.76  The SEC has recognized the importance of surveillance-
sharing agreements “in the context of exchange listing of security prod-
ucts, such as equity options” since the early 1990s, and that its approval 
of one of the first commodity-linked ETPs in 1995 was based on the list-
ing exchange’s “surveillance-sharing agreements with each of the futures 
markets on which pricing of the ETP would be based.”77  While Commis-
sioner Peirce is correct in noting that the text of Section (6)(b)(5) of the 
Exchange Act says nothing about surveillance-sharing agreements, it ap-
pears that they have become an accepted and ingrained part of the SEC’s 
consideration of ETPs.78   
1.  The First Prong of the Section 6(b)(5) Surveillance-Sharing 
Agreement Test: Defining “Regulated Market”  
Whether a market is regulated such that it meets the first prong of 
the SEC’s Section 6(b)(5) test is relatively clear when it comes to bitcoin-
based ETPs.  In evaluating the sufficiency of the surveillance-sharing 
agreement between BZX and the Gemini Exchange in the Winklevoss 
proposal, the SEC established another standard that underlies the “regu-
lated” prong of their Section (6)(b)(5) test.79  For a market to be “regu-
lated” it must be “comparable to a national securities exchange or to the 
futures exchanges that are associated with the underlying assets of the 
commodity-trust ETPs approved to date.”80   
The Winklevoss proposal failed to meet the first prong of the 
SEC’s Section 6(b)(5) test because its surveillance-sharing agreement 
was with the Gemini Exchange.81  The Gemini Exchange is regulated by 
the New York State Department of Financial Services (“NYSDFS”) and 
 
 75. Pierce, supra note 36, at n.13. 
 76. Pierce, supra note 36, at n.13. 
 77. WINKLEVOSS DISAPPROVAL ORDER, supra note 7, at 51–52.  
 78. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 6(b)(5), 15 U.S.C. § 78f(b)(5) (2012).   
 79. See WINKLEVOSS DISAPPROVAL ORDER, supra note 7, at 60 (“Even if the Gemini Ex-
change were “regulated,” the record does not support a finding that the Gemini Exchange 
represents a “significant” bitcoin-related market.”).  
 80. WINKLEVOSS DISAPPROVAL ORDER, supra note 7, at 60. 
 81. WINKLEVOSS DISAPPROVAL ORDER, supra note 7, at 60. 
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is subject to “capitalization, anti-money-laundering, compliance, con-
sumer protection, and cybersecurity requirements” as a result.82  How-
ever, the SEC listed a variety of additional types of regulations that it 
looks for in a “regulated market” which are not present under NYSDFS 
supervision.83  In sum, the Winklevoss order made it clear that being sub-
ject to regulation does not make a market “regulated,” and a proposer 
must find a market that is regulated to a significant extent in order to meet 
the first prong of the SEC’s test.84  
While this is an exacting standard, the SEC preserved some flex-
ibility by stating that the “regulated market” does not have to be the 
bitcoin spot market.85  This left open the possibility for a bitcoin com-
modity-trust ETP to meet the requirements of Section 6(b)(5) by estab-
lishing a surveillance-sharing agreement with a regulated bitcoin deriva-
tives market that is of significant size.86   
The ETF proposals that followed the Winklevoss Order, while 
also disapproved by the SEC, successfully established surveillance-shar-
ing agreements with markets that qualified as “regulated.”  These pro-
posals established agreements to share information with the CME and 
Cboe87 Futures Exchange (“CFE”) which are self-regulatory 
 
 82. WINKLEVOSS DISAPPROVAL ORDER, supra note 7, at 64. 
 83. See WINKLEVOSS DISAPPROVAL ORDER, supra note 7, at 65 (explaining that national 
securities exchanges are required to have rules “designed to prevent fraudulent and manipu-
lative acts and practices, to promote just and equitable principles of trade, to foster coopera-
tion and coordination with persons engaged in regulating, clearing, settling, processing infor-
mation with respect to, and facilitating transactions in securities, to remove impediments to 
and perfect the mechanism of a free and open market and a national market system, and, in 
general to protect investors and the public interest,” and are “subject to Commission oversight 
of, among other things, their governance, membership qualifications, trading rules, discipli-
nary procedures, recordkeeping, and fees.”) 
 84. See WINKLEVOSS DISAPPROVAL ORDER, supra note 7, at 65 (providing a list of rules 
and reporting mechanisms that must be in place for a market to be regulated like a national 
securities exchange). 
 85. WINKLEVOSS DISAPPROVAL ORDER, supra note 7, at 76.  
 86. See WINKLEVOSS DISAPPROVAL ORDER, supra note 7, at 76 (stating that the regulated 
market does not have to be the bitcoin spot market).   
 87. On January 22, 2019, the Cboe pulled their proposal, citing the government shutdown 
and a plan to re-submit once things were resolved.  Nikhilesh De, Cboe Exchange Withdraws 
Proposal for VanEck-SolidX Bitcoin ETF, COINDESK (Jan 23, 2019), 
https://www.coindesk.com/cboe-withdraws-proposal-for-vaneck-solidx-bitcoin-etf.; see 
Jimmy Aki, U.S. SEC Delays Decision on VanEck’s Bitcoin ETF Until February 2018, 
BITCOIN MAG. (Dec. 7, 2018), https://bitcoinmagazine.com/articles/us-sec-delays-decision-
vanecks-bitcoin-etf-until-february-2019/ (explaining how the SEC has postponed their review 
decision of their disapprovals of every bitcoin ETP that has been proposed to date to the fullest 
extent permissible under the SEC’s governing rules).   
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organizations that are subject to CFTC oversight.88  The SEC found these 
surveillance-sharing agreements to be insufficient not because the mar-
kets were unregulated, but because the markets were not of a “significant 
size.”89  
2.  The Second Prong of the Section 6(b)(5) Surveillance-Sharing 
Agreement Test: Defining “Significant Size”  
In the Winklevoss Order, the SEC defined a “market of signifi-
cant size” or “significant market” as:  
 
a market (or group of markets) as to which (a) there is a 
reasonable likelihood that a person attempting to manip-
ulate the ETP would also have to trade on that market to 
successfully manipulate the ETP, so that a surveillance-
sharing agreement would assist the ETP listing market in 
detecting and deterring misconduct, and (b) it is unlikely 
that trading in the ETP would be the predominant influ-
ence on prices in that market.90   
 
In determining that the Gemini Exchange is not a market of “significant 
size,” the SEC pointed to an overarching concern that it has about the 
bitcoin market:  there is no centralized, official source that captures data 
about worldwide bitcoin trading.91  This is a major issue for bitcoin com-
modity-trust ETPs because the lack of a centralized official source of 
bitcoin trading data makes it difficult to present information about the 
volume of trading or liquidity of the underlying exchange to a regulator.92  
This void ultimately prevents the SEC from having clear information 
about the size of the surveillance-sharing market to show that a person 
seeking to manipulate the ETP would have to trade on the market and that 
ETP trading would not seriously influence the market’s prices.93  
 
 88. DIREXION DISAPPROVAL ORDER, supra note 6, at 1; GRANITESHARES DISAPPROVAL 
ORDER, supra note 36, at 1.  
 89. DIREXION DISAPPROVAL ORDER, supra note 6, at 17; GRANITESHARES DISAPPROVAL 
ORDER, supra note 36, at 13.  
 90. See WINKLEVOSS DISAPPROVAL ORDER, supra note 7, at 53 (noting that the definition 
is “illustrative not exclusive”). 
 91. WINKLEVOSS DISAPPROVAL ORDER, supra note 7, at 66.  
 92. WINKLEVOSS DISAPPROVAL ORDER, supra note 7, at 66–67.  
 93. WINKLEVOSS DISAPPROVAL ORDER, supra note 7, at 66–67. 
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Post-Winklevoss ETP proposals aimed to meet Section 6(b)(5) 
by arranging for surveillance-sharing agreements with the CME and CFE 
on which bitcoin futures have been trading. 94  Although both of these 
markets are regulated by the CFTC and are members of the Intermarket 
Surveillance Group, the SEC still found the surveillance-sharing agree-
ment to be insufficient as the CME and CFE markets had not been shown 
to be “markets of significant size.”95  In its disapproval of an ETF based 
on bitcoin futures, the SEC noted that previous ETP proposals dealt with 
“a large futures market that had been trading for a number of years before 
an exchange proposed an ETP based on those futures.”96  In a lengthy 
footnote, the SEC followed this point with a list of the date on which a 
future began trading and the date its ETP was approved for trading.97  For 
example, ETPs based on fiat currency futures began trading on average 
seventeen years after the futures began trading in the US market.98  This 
precedent may explain the SEC’s hesitance to approve an ETP based on 
bitcoin futures as bitcoin futures only began trading in 2017.99  
IV. MOVING FORWARD FROM THE SEC’S DISAPPROVALS 
A.  The Potential for Surveillance-Sharing Agreements with 
Overseas Exchanges 
The ultimate roadblock that faces cryptocurrency-based ETPs is 
that no market appears to exist at present that meets the SEC’s definition 
of a “regulated market of significant size.”100  Even if an exchange could 
enter into a surveillance-sharing agreement with an overseas spot or de-
rivatives market that involves a larger volume of bitcoin than the Gemini 
Exchange, CFE, or CME, this would only address half of the SEC’s con-
cerns.101  It is likely that even if such a market were large enough to qual-
ify as of “significant size,” it would not meet the regulatory requirements 
 
 94. DIREXION DISAPPROVAL ORDER, supra note 6, at 17.  
 95. DIREXION DISAPPROVAL ORDER, supra note 6, at 17.  
 96. GRANITESHARES DISAPPROVAL ORDER, supra note 36, at 13.  
 97. GRANITESHARES DISAPPROVAL ORDER, supra note 36, at 13. 
 98. GRANITESHARES DISAPPROVAL ORDER, supra note 36, at 13 n.37. 
 99. See GRANITESHARES DISAPPROVAL ORDER, supra note 36, at 27 (“[B]itcoin futures 
have been trading on CME and CFE only since December 2017.”). 
 100. WINKLEVOSS DISAPPROVAL ORDER, supra note 7, at 5. 
 101. See GRANITESHARES DISAPPROVAL ORDER, supra note 36, at 27 (“While CME and 
CFE are regulated markets for bitcoin derivatives, there is no basis in the record for the Com-
mission to conclude that these markets are of significant size.”) 
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of the SEC’s test.  The SEC’s example is a national securities exchange 
or futures exchange similar to ones in previously approved ETPs; there-
fore, it is unlikely that surveillance-sharing agreements with international 
exchanges would facilitate approval.102  The SEC appears to be unim-
pressed with foreign regulatory efforts, as it has specifically mentioned 
that efforts to create “regulatory sandboxes” for blockchain technology 
abroad do not provide the fraud detection and prevention required by Sec-
tion 6(b)(5).103  Additionally, ETPs that successfully presented surveil-
lance-sharing agreements and received SEC approval in the past entered 
into agreements with futures exchanges that were not only significant but 
were also regulated by the CFTC, a domestic federal regulator.104   
B.  The Innate Dissonance Between Cryptocurrency and the Section 
6(b)(5) Test  
Cryptocurrency also has innate characteristics that may prevent 
its ETPs from ever meeting the Section 6(b)(5) test.  Although the SEC 
has reiterated in its disapproval orders that it is not passing judgment on 
“bitcoin or blockchain technology . . . as an innovation or an invest-
ment,”105 its statements regarding the anonymity of traders and parties to 
transactions and lack of regulatory oversight abroad address qualities that 
may be so ingrained in the nature of cryptocurrency that markets of sig-
nificant size cannot ever be regulated to the extent that the SEC has 
deemed necessary.106   
One of the unique qualities of cryptocurrency is the pseudonym-
ity of the parties involved in transactions.107  However, this characteristic 
creates a misalignment between the SEC’s ideas about deterring market 
manipulation and the identifiers available in the cryptocurrency space.  
As stated in the Winklevoss Order: 
 
 102. See WINKLEVOSS DISAPPROVAL ORDER, supra note 7, at 65 (explaining the differ-
ences between nationally-regulated exchanges and state-regulated exchanges).  
 103. WINKLEVOSS DISAPPROVAL ORDER, supra note 7, at 73.  
 104. See, e.g., GRANITESHARES DISAPPROVAL ORDER, supra note 36, at 9 n.35 (listing the 
descriptions of “comprehensive surveillance sharing agreements” in past approval orders for 
exchange traded funds).   
 105. WINKLEVOSS DISAPPROVAL ORDER, supra note 7, at 5; GRANITESHARES 
DISAPPROVAL ORDER, supra note 36, at 2; DIREXION DISAPPROVAL ORDER, supra note 6, at 2. 
 106. WINKLEVOSS DISAPPROVAL ORDER, supra note 7, at 73.  
 107. Satoshi Nakamoto, Bitcoin: A Peer-to-Peer Electronic Cash System, BITCOIN.ORG 6 
(2008), https://bitcoin.org/bitcoin.pdf (discussing the privacy of bitcoin transactions where 
“the public can see that someone is sending an amount to someone else, but without infor-
mation linking the transaction to anyone”). 
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[T]he public blockchain ledger, even in combination with 
the other monitoring abilities BZX identifies, does not 
provide comprehensive customer trading or identity in-
formation, which is particularly important here because 
pseudonymous bitcoin account holding means, among 
other things, that the number of accounts or number of 
trades would not reveal whether a person or group has a 
dominant ownership position in bitcoin, or is using or at-
tempting to use a dominant ownership position to manip-
ulate bitcoin pricing.108 
 
Some issues facing cryptocurrency-based ETPs may be resolved 
with time.  In the Winklevoss Order, the SEC noted its concern that the 
bitcoin market is at greater risk for manipulation because bitcoin owner-
ship is still relatively concentrated in a small group of early investors.109  
This increases the ability for investors to collude and manipulate the mar-
ket in their favor using their control over a dominant share.110  If more 
people do in fact invest in cryptocurrency, the SEC’s concern about con-
solidated holders of bitcoin should diminish.  However, this improvement 
may not be possible without regulation that encourages more people to 
feel that bitcoin is a secure investment, creating a catch-22.111  
 
 
C. The Potential for a Cryptocurrency Self-Regulatory 
Organization to Address Section 6(b)(5): The Virtual 
Commodity Association 
The ultimate purpose of Section 6(b)(5) of the Exchange Act is 
to create national securities exchanges that are able to monitor and deter 
fraud and manipulation in their market.112  The surveillance-sharing 
agreement with a regulated market of significant size is one way to 
 
 108. WINKLEVOSS DISAPPROVAL ORDER, supra note 7, at 44.  
 109. WINKLEVOSS DISAPPROVAL ORDER, supra note 7, at 26–27.  
 110. WINKLEVOSS DISAPPROVAL ORDER, supra note 7, at 26–27.  
 111. See Bitcoin ETF Will Lead to Billions of New Capital [But Not in 2018], CNBC (July 
26, 2018) https://www.ccn.com/bitcoin-etf-will-lead-to-billions-of-new-capital-but-not-in-
2018/ (describing investor skepticism towards cryptocurrency).  
 112. WINKLEVOSS DISAPPROVAL ORDER, supra note 7, at 76.  
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facilitate this goal but it presents a difficult barrier for exchange-traded 
products in a largely unregulated area.  A cryptocurrency self-regulatory 
organization (“CSRO”), such as the one that has been established by the 
Winklevoss twins following the second disapproval of their bitcoin-based 
commodity-trust ETP, has the potential to move cryptocurrency towards 
meeting the Section 6(b)(5) test.113   
Self-regulatory organizations (“SROs”) are not at all unusual in 
the financial markets landscape.114  Prior to the enactment of federal reg-
ulation, the U.S. derivatives market was self-regulated.115  Today, SROs 
are heavily involved in the regulation of financial markets and include 
National Securities Exchanges, Registered Securities Associations 
(FINRA), and Notice-Registered Securities Future Product Exchanges, 
including the CFE and CME.116  CSROs have emerged in other countries 
including Croatia, Japan, Switzerland, the UK, and Slovenia that have 
been more friendly to cryptocurrency.117  While SROs are not perfect en-
tities, the idea of self-regulation carries weight with many in the crypto-
community as well as with U.S. regulators who feel that those involved 
with cryptocurrency directly may be best suited to craft its regulatory 
framework.118   
On August 20, 2018, less than a month after the SEC released its 
second disapproval of their bitcoin-based ETP, the Winklevoss twins an-
nounced that they would be working with Bitstamp, Inc., bitFlyer USA, 
Inc., Bittrex, Inc., and Gemini Trust Company, LLC to form a CSRO.119  
The shared goals of the Virtual Commodity Association (“VCA”) are to 
improve “transparency, accountability and security across all virtual 
 
 113. See Ryan Clements, Can a Cryptocurrency Self-Regulatory Organization Work? As-
sessing Its Promise and Likely Challenges, DUKE FIN. REG. BLOG (June 21, 2018), 
https://sites.duke.edu/thefinregblog/2018/06/21/can-a-cryptocurrency-self-regulatory-organ-
ization-work-assessing-its-promise-and-likely-challenges/ (discussing “drawbacks and un-
certainties” with CSROs as well as support from CFTC Commissioner Brian Quintez). 
 114. Roger Aitken, U.S. CFTC Comm’n Says Cryptocurrency Exchanges Adopting ‘Self-
Regulation’ Could Spur Standards, FORBES (Feb. 15, 2018), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/rogeraitken/2018/02/15/u-s-cftc-commissioner-says-crypto-
currency-exchanges-adopting-self-regulation-could-spur-standards/#8d7d9df45e12.  
 115. Id.   
 116. SELF-REGULATORY ORGANIZATION RULEMAKING, 
https://www.sec.gov/rules/sro.shtml (last visited Feb. 9, 2019). 
 117. Clements, supra note 113. 
 118. Clements, supra note 113. 
 119. The Virtual Commodity Association Working Group Has Formed and is Planning 
Inaugural Meeting, BUS. WIRE (Aug. 20, 2018), https://www.business-
wire.com/news/home/20180820005066/en/Virtual-Commodity-Association-Working-
Group-Formed-Planning. 
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currency trading platforms.”120  Two of the major ways that the VCA 
could help alleviate some of the SEC’s concerns are through increased 
information about trading volumes across platforms and the creation of a 
group with a combined significant market cap with an international pres-
ence.  Bitstamp is based in Slovenia, bitFlyer is based in Japan, and Bit-
trex and Gemini are based in the U.S.121  BitFlyer was the world’s largest 
bitcoin exchange when it entered the U.S. in 2017.122  The VCA also 
makes “Information Sharing” one of its early goals, perhaps in a nod to 
the SEC.123   
The VCA has a decent chance at meeting the SEC’s “market of 
significant size” requirement because it is an association of four interna-
tional platforms including the world’s largest bitcoin exchange in 
2017.124  However, the “regulated” prong of the SEC’s test may prevent 
the VCA from being the entity with which bitcoin-ETP proposers could 
successfully enter into a surveillance-sharing agreement.125  The VCA 
should take notice of the qualities that the SEC has said it looks for in a 
regulated market and try to meet them in its self-regulatory policies.126   
Along with establishing the VCA, the Winklevoss twins hired 
Deloitte & Touche to conduct an SOC-2 Type 1 examination of the 
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securities exchanges are required to have rules “designed to prevent fraudulent and manipu-
lative acts and practices, to promote just and equitable principles of trade, to foster coopera-
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nary procedures, recordkeeping, and fees.”). 
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Gemini exchange.127  SOC-2 Type 1 examinations are a type of CPA-
conducted audit of an organization that provides services to other enti-
ties.128  The product of an SOC-2 Type 1 examination is a “Report on 
Controls at a Service Organization Relevant to Security, Availability, 
Processing Integrity, Confidentiality or Privacy.”129  The AICPA’s web-
site states that “[t]hese reports play an important role in: oversight of the 
organization, vendor management programs, internal corporate govern-
ance, and risk management processes,” and most interestingly, “regula-
tory oversight.”130  This description speaks to the Winklevoss twins’ ef-
forts to do what they can to show the SEC that their exchange is regulated 
in accordance with the SEC’s Section 6(b)(5) test.  While this examina-
tion addresses the security of the Gemini exchange platform, it does not 
address the size of the bitcoin market or lack thereof.131  Therefore, alt-
hough the positive results of the SOC-2 Type 1 examination could be 
used to help the Winklevoss twins argue that Gemini is a secure ex-
change, the examination does not resolve the SEC’s concerns about the 
size of the bitcoin market, or provide the kind of regulation that the SEC 
is looking for.  
V. CONCLUSION 
Cryptocurrency is facing a unique set of challenges, many of 
which stem from its relationship with traditional financial systems regu-
lators such as the SEC.132  While the SEC has good intentions— to protect 
investors from fraud and market manipulation—the SEC’s application of 
Section 6(b)(5) of the Exchange Act of 1934 was strict and left bitcoin-
based ETPs with little ability to meet the SEC’s test.133  This is certainly 
not the place that ETP hopefuls want to be in but perhaps something good 
will come out of their inability to gain the SEC’s approval.  The SEC’s 
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lengthy disapproval orders pointed out many legitimate weaknesses in 
the cryptocurrency market and, arguably, this spurred the Winklevoss 
twins to establish the first cryptocurrency self-regulatory organization in 
the U.S. in combination with exchanges from around the world.134  
Through a CSRO, bitcoin has the potential to follow in the foot-
steps of other nascent financial markets and institute regulation before 
federal regulators feel comfortable enough to step in.135  This could break 
bitcoin ETPs out of the regulatory catch-22 that has formed from the 
SEC’s application and interpretation of Section (6)(b)(5), allowing com-
panies to increase surveillance of the markets, create consolidated data 
collection about market volumes and liquidity, and deter market manip-
ulation and fraud.  Even if these measures do not result in the SEC’s ap-
proval of a bitcoin-based ETP, they have the potential to increase investor 
confidence in the stability of bitcoin markets thereby encouraging market 
growth.136  
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